Unconventional Warfare

The United States Army is superbly equipped, trained, and organized to fight a conventional land war, anywhere. But based on its experience since 2003 in Iraq and Afghanistan, it is neither, equipped, trained, nor organized to engage in the type of unconventional warfare it has been faced with in the present conflict.

This is not a new problem. Caesar was surprised when Hannibal took the elephants over the Alps. This is the essence of unconventional warfare: keep the enemy off balance at all times. Conventional forces, particularly line commanders, have always had difficulty adapting to unorthodox concepts. From Roger’s Rangers to Carlson’s Raiders commanders were very reluctant to allow the “sneaky pete” activities required by covert operations.

In the recent debacle in Lebanon, when Israelis tried to take on Hezbollah with armor and airpower they got a bloody nose for their trouble. This was all the more disturbing because the Israeli army has some of the best and most experienced unconventional warfare units extant.

U.S. Rangers and Special Forces units are regularly used as Infantry line outfits. They are wasted in being so employed. In the first place, they have none of the support units normally assigned to Infantry, especially Artillery and heavy weapons. And the Army is wasting valuable talent by employing these specialized warriors as riflemen. At the beginning of the war, some hope was generated when it was announced that all Special Forces would be under a single umbrella organization. Whatever happened to that idea, no one knows.

To effectively organize and use unconventional forces, the Army should search for a leader like “Wild Bill Donovan”. The officers from the Command and General Staff Colleges and the War College are so steeped in the “correct solutions” they are incapable of using any ingenuity. It will take an innovator (some might say wildcat) willing to break moss-backed tradition to effectively counter the terrorists in unconventional warfare.